Stranger than Fiction: Real History

Sounds like she didn't want to get married and did anyway. My take away was, "Why did she bother?"

Lol, yes, she appears to have had a different idea about marriage than you or me. But, I get the sense she didn't do anything she didn't want to do. In any case, whatever they had worked for them. They stayed married until she went missing.
 
In 1947, Sen. Richard Russell Jr. of Georgia proposed that England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales should become four new states of the United States of America. He may have been the only person on earth who thought this was a good idea.

Normally this would be laughed off as the ravings of a crackpot, but he was a U.S. Senator, so the media reported on it. Press reports from 1947 note that the British received the idea "coldly". Think absolute zero.

Of course, they didn't just launch into a tirade of expletives. The British are much too sophisticated for such a coarse response. So rather than condemn Senator Russell, the plucky Brits simply pointed out that Georgia still owed money borrowed from the British during the Civil War.

It was the perfect retort. Russell assumed that America held the upper hand because the US just bailed out Britain in World War II. He had forgotten that England had spent millions to help the South in the war between the states ... and that money was never repaid.

So maybe this whole thing was backward? Perhaps Georgia should've been added to the United Kingdom. ;)

As the rhetoric escalated, Southerners claimed they really didn't owe anything because the Civil War debts were payable in Confederate dollars ... and since the Confederacy didn't exist any more, they were off the hook. This sounds like the reasoning that a really shonky lawyer would use.

Fortunately, after a brief flurry in the spring of 1947, the whole UK statehood idea died an appropriate death.

(from "Lost States" by Michael J. Trinklein, 2010. A hilarious and informative book, telling the stories of states that never made it) :)
 
the plucky Brits simply pointed out that Georgia still owed money borrowed from the British during the Civil War.

I am highly skeptical that the UK government financially supported the South in the Civil War. I couldn't find anything about this online. Have you got any independent source to back up Trinklein's claim?

It seems the official position of the UK was one of neutrality.
 
The South hoped Britain would come in on its side due to that country's need for the South's cotton. Ships that ran the blockade in Southern waters took cotton to England, where factories accepted it gladly, but no offer of support was ever officially extended.
 
I am highly skeptical that the UK government financially supported the South in the Civil War. I couldn't find anything about this online. Have you got any independent source to back up Trinklein's claim?

It seems the official position of the UK was one of neutrality.

Hmm, I'm no expert and don't know why Trinklein is making this claim, except possibly this (from wikipedia's article - United Kingdom and the American Civil War - Wikipedia)

Large-scale trade continued between Britain and the US. The US shipped grain to Britain, and Britain sold manufactured items and munitions to the US. British trade with the Confederacy fell over 90% from the prewar period, with a small amount of cotton going to Britain and hundreds of thousands of munitions and luxury goods slipped in by numerous small blockade runners operated and funded by British private interests.
(emphasis mine)

So perhaps this is what he means -- that even though official British-Confederacy trade fell so sharply, British "private interests" (whatever that means) were still using unofficial means to trade with the Confederacy ... and that trade was pretty darn strong, to put it mildly.

I'm not sure who paid for all these munitions and luxury goods (or even if they were paid for), or where they went to -- the local grandees? Shops? *shrug* I'm sure someone with more knowledge of this than I would know better. But at least it's a start! :)

Maybe someone with deep pockets and a vested interest in seeing the Confederacy succeed was paying blockade runners to ship munitions to the South? *shrug* But I'm just conjecturing.
 
That's not a bad idea. In vino veritas, as they say, but in this case it's the other way around.

At the start of World War 1, the French army was still using uniforms that had been used in the 19th century, comprising of bright red woolen trousers (famously known as "les pantalons rouge"), light blue coat, and a red-and-blue cap.

The French Minister of War, Adolphe Messimy, had observed the actions of the 1912–13 Balkan Wars. He was well-regarded as a humane and professional army officer, and in 1914, he proposed replacing the pantalon rouge, red kepis and blue tunics with less conspicuous colours. But his proposals were rejected after opposition in the press that it was "contrary both to French taste and military function". The press attacked him fiercely, adding (e.g. in the Écho de Paris) that he was trying "to banish all that is colourful, all that gives the soldier his vivid aspect ...which goes contrary both to French taste and military function".

Former war minister Eugène Étienne also opposed the proposal, declaring "jamais! le pantalon rouge, c'est la France" ("Never! The red trousers are France!"), which became a catchphrase of the conservative movement in France.

The outcry over the proposal almost cost Messimy his ministerial position, and he wrote bitterly, "This imbecilic attachment to the most visible of colours will have dire consequences." He was right. At the Battles of the Frontiers, just three weeks after the war started, the French lost 329,000 men, including 27,000 in just one day - August 22, 1914. (Imagine men in red and blue marching across fields of yellow wheat in the August sun, and you can see how visible they would be to snipers, riflemen, machine guns, and artillery).

The French press and former ministers were well-intentioned, but they failed to realise how much more lethal twentieth-century firepower was, especially compared to the nineteenth, and particularly to soldiers in an open field. The result was an unmitigated disaster.

By contrast, the Germans -- with their usual Teutonic efficiency -- had adopted helmets as early as 1914. See this cool video to witness how German uniforms changed across the two world wars. :)

 
The British did not do away with the redcoat until the Boer war (1899-1902).

I think the Americans used to call them lobster-backs.
 
Correct on both counts. ;) The British were also still using bayonets in the Boer War (although the one you mention, i.e. 1899-1902, was the Second Boer War; the first was in the 1880s).

The English had trouble in the Boer War because of two issues:

1. They disregarded the Boer settlers as "uncouth" or "uncivilised farm boys", who would be no match for professional soldiers;

2. They were still wearing their redcoats, which were completely inappropriate for the savanna / bushfeld.

The trouble was, the Boers were expert marksmen (you had to be if you wanted to catch dinner) ... and the redcoats gave them unmissable targets for the chest, stomach and arms.

The British were also led by incompetent generals such as Sir Redvers Buller (who believed in fighting wars as if he was on the marching ground) and Sir Charles Warren (who failed to catch Jack the Ripper ... and the Boers). Only when Kitchener arrived in South Africa did the war come to an end.

It should, of course, be mentioned that Kitchener instituted such draconian measures as to amount to genocide. Of course, that term didn't exist then.
 
The British were also led by incompetent generals such as Sir Redvers Buller (who believed in fighting wars as if he was on the marching ground)

Buller was not incompetent. He wasn't up to the task of leading an army, but he was a good, if unspectacular divisional commander. Once Earl Roberts took overall command, Buller chalked up a string of solid victories. He had earlier distinguished himself during the Anglo-Zulu War, which is why he was elevated to the position he was in in the first place.

His early, costly defeats overshadowed his later record, but he was no Raglan, he had held successful active field commands before. He learned from his early errors.
 
I took my grand-nephew and his friends for a tour of Fort George here in Niagara, on a hot summer day, and they had reenactments, done by men dressed in the full British uniform, Redcoat and all, and all I could think was how overheated they must have been!
 
Bayonets are still used by armed forces all over the world today.

In bayonet charges, like they did in the 1700s? *thinks* Surely the Bayonet Charge is an idea whose time is past.

Buller was not incompetent. He wasn't up to the task of leading an army, but he was a good, if unspectacular divisional commander. Once Earl Roberts took overall command, Buller chalked up a string of solid victories. He had earlier distinguished himself during the Anglo-Zulu War, which is why he was elevated to the position he was in in the first place.

His early, costly defeats overshadowed his later record, but he was no Raglan, he had held successful active field commands before. He learned from his early errors.
It's true that Buller was very good when someone else was giving the orders, but he couldn't hack it as a general ... and I'm judging him on his performance as a general.

Black Week (1899, summed up by the devastated defeats at Stormberg, Magesfontein and Colenso) was a disaster for the Brits, and an eye opener for the government and troops, who had thought that the war could be won very easily. Buller's decisions at Ladysmith caused him to be sacked and replaced with Lord Roberts, and that was the end of his career as overall commander. After that, he was 2IC to Roberts.

Perhaps Buller needed someone to give him orders, and wasn't comfortable with making his own decisions. But making your own decisions is what a general does, and Buller failed at that. That's all.
 
It's true that Buller was very good when someone else was giving the orders, but he couldn't hack it as a general ... and I'm judging him on his performance as a general.

He had no time to prepare when he arrived in South Africa. Ladysmith was under siege and there was political pressure on him to relieve it. You're judging him on his 3 months as overall commander, and buying into the the narrative of the time. He wasn't blameless, but doesn't deserve all the opprobrium heaped on him in the contemporary press. He was placed in command in Natal after Roberts arrived, and he was successful there for the rest of the war.

OK, I'm bored now, and this isn't the forum or thread for it, so I'm out of this strand of the discussion.
 
(Scurries off to do a little research in an attempt to ameliorate ignorance about the Boer War.)
 
All right, here's a more fun discussion: the two-day weekend as we know it didn't exist before the 19th century.

In the early 19th century, the concept of a weekend began to form in industrial Britain, where factory owners and workers agreed to Saturday afternoons off to ensure workers were sober, rested and refreshed for Monday.

In 1843, a campaign started in Greater Manchester to give mill workers a half-day holiday on Saturday afternoons. This was granted in September 1843, and is considered the invention of the weekend.

Jewish workers observed (and many still do observe) the Sabbath, from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. This led to the first American five-day workweek in 1908 to accommodate them.

The concept was later formalised into a true two-day weekend in the early 20th century by figures like Henry Ford, who granted his workers a full Saturday and Sunday off by 1926 to encourage leisure spending. (That doesn't quite make up for him being a horrible racist bastard, though). =P Ford, by the way, didn't do this for humanitarian reasons but to create customers for his cars.

This was then cemented into law in the United States by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which established a forty-hour workweek.

The two-day weekend quickly spread across the globe, becoming standard in countries like the United States and Canada by 1955. By the 1970s, the 40-hour workweek and weekend were common across Europe.

Not everyone had a two-day weekend, though. People who worked in rich and middle-class British houses, like butlers, cooks, footmen, maids and so on certainly didn't. Their only time off consisted of Sunday for church (which was obligatory) and possibly one afternoon off each week (which was a luxury rather than standard practice, not guaranteed, and some servants didn't even get that).

It's possible that the people who owned the rich houses didn't think of this as cruel, but simply standard practice. In an era before electric conveniences like washing machines, vacuum cleaners and so on, it was impossible for a rich family to "keep up appearances" without a horde of servants to do all the cleaning, dusting and cooking. It was simply a different economic reality to what we are used to.

Also, many men and women who went into service simply had no other jobs they could do, apart from working in a factory or in a shop, and at least working in a rich house meant a roof over your head and guaranteed meals. But the hours were long, the work was hard, and the pay wasn't always very good. (Sorry for the understatement). ;)
 
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